One of the curious features of the debate is that the freedom issue is partly regarded as an a priori one, partly as an empirical one by the same people. On the one hand you can read theses like the following:
In order to find out that we are determined we would not need the Libet experiments. The idea of a free human will is in principle incompatible with scientific reasoning. Science presupposes that everything that happens has its causes and that one can find these causes. For me it is not understandable that someone who does empirical science can believe that free, i.e. non-determined action is conceivable. (Prinz 2004, 22) 1 On the other hand the same people put together ample empirical material that they consider to be evidence for determinism, and the reference to empirical findings is surely the decisive argument for the public reception and credit of these claims. Here is a popular nutshell-summary of these findings by Gerhard Roth: 1 "Um festzustellen, dass wir determiniert sind, bräuchten wir die Libet-Experimente nicht. Die Idee eines freien menschlichen Willens ist mit wissenschaftlichen Überlegungen prinzipiell nicht zu vereinbaren. Wissenschaft geht davon aus, dass alles, was geschieht, seine Ursachen hat und dass man diese Ursachen finden kann. Für mich ist unverständlich, dass jemand, der empirische Wissenschaft betreibt, glauben kann, dass freies, also nichtdeterminiertes Handeln denkbar ist." (All translations W. L.) 2 Not only for the sake of brevity, I will not address the Libet/Haggard/Eimer experiments in this paper. Recent experiments by Herrmann et al. (2005) considerably reduced their relevance. These experiments confirm the suggestion spelled out by numerous interprets in the past that the readiness potential is not more than an unspecific expectation activity of the brain, and not a determination of the action. By combining the Libet-experiment with choice-reaction task, Herrmann et al. convincingly show that the readiness potential is already present before exposition to the relevant information, i.e. at a time when the willing process cannot even have begun.
Test persons can subliminally (e.g. via masked stimuli) by experimental tricks, hypnosis or brain stimulation be caused to actions of which they later claim that they willed them (Penfield and Rasmussen, 1950; Wegner, 2002; Roth, 2003) . (Roth 2004, 15; similar Roth 2006, 10) 3 Dozens of similar summaries can be found in literature. And as they stand, they seem to provide a massive empirical backing for determinism. Even our strong feeling of authorship and control can be proven to be an illusion, so we are told, but authorship and control is traditionally regarded as one of the conditions for an ontologically respectable conception of freedom. Summaries like that find a broad audience, they are taken for granted by many people including philosophers, scientists from various disciplines, science journalists and science politicians. Sometimes such summaries even get a bit face-lifted, consciously or unconsciously. An example is the following passage from GEO, a popular science magazine with thousands of readers. In an otherwise very careful, critical and balanced article on the consequences of neuroscience, the German neuroscientist Franz Mechsner reports the state of research as follows:
In his book Das Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit Gerhard Roth, professor of brain research at the University of Bremen, describes experiments which are illustrative in this point. The experiments were carried out on patients whose skulls had to be opened for medical reasons. If certain cortex areas of the brain (which is insensitive to pain) were stimulated by electrodes, e.g. an arm could be raised. (Penfield and Rasmussen, 1950; Wegner, 2002; Roth, 2003 The problem here is not only that we get the wrong impression that these experiments were carried out just recently at the University of Bremen. Rather, the problem is the newly inserted word "regularly". This really leaves nothing to desire for the naturalist: It seems now that we have easily repeatable experiments with strict correlations. Mechsner's rendering of the matter is not an exception; in numerous similar texts it is suggested as commonplace that actions (i.e. behavior with an accompanying "inner side" like intentions, plans, explanations etc.) could be triggered by external stimulation of the brain. Critical readers might become suspicious here. Beyond medicotechnical problems, should it really so easily be possible to cause people to movements which they report as willed? Would not the test persons at least become suspicious after a certain number of rounds? If experts who really conduct experiments in empirical brain research are being asked about such findings, they usually answer like "… never heard. Of course you can cause various sorts of spasms, tremors, seizures, emotional outbursts, inhibitions, even movements of limbs by stimulation, but never actions. Test persons always report that these effects somehow came from outside, for example that they can't resist to a strange desire to move the arm, but in any case that these movements are not willed by them." 
SCOPE, CONSTRAINTS AND DISCLAIMERS
The thesis of my paper is that these seemingly robust empirical claims, as they are boasted by Roth and others, are In order not to be misunderstood, some constraints and disclaimers on my agenda seem appropriate.
Firstly, the scope of this paper is in fact tiny-it is not more than a casestudy. My question is only whether this particular, aforementioned claim that full-blown actions with the feeling of authorship can be caused by external stimulation is empirically warranted. Though my answer here will be to the negative; I do of course not doubt that there is a mass of evidence that actions, decisions and perceptions can be influenced and biased in countless ways.
Secondly, my claim is a purely factual one, not an "in principle" one. I only show that the purported results from the past do not prove what they are supposed to prove. I do not exclude that someone at some time could perhaps really design an experiment where it is plausible that full-blown actions can be triggered.
Thirdly, I do not aim at defending any particular account of human freedom, especially not an incompatibilist one. I just scrutinize the empirical backing of some claims.
Lastly, I do not want to promote any postmodernist ideas (of science as a whole as narrative, etc.). When talking about narrative, I mean it in the straightforward, all-day sense and not in the sense of Lyotard and others. But I found no better word to label the astonishing development that will henceforth be described.
DISENTANGLING PROBABILISTIC AND STRICT CORRELATIONS
Let us start with a look at one of the more elaborate and detailed summaries that Gerhard Roth offers about earlier research:
Electrical stimulations of the cortex were amply conducted by the Canadian neurologist Wilder Penfield since the 1930s. […-here follows a closer description of the epilepsy patients, W. L.]. Stimulation in points of the somatosensory cortex directly in front of the central fissure lead-depending on the place-to a tingling in certain parts of the body, stimulation of the primary motor cortex to spasms of particular muscles or muscle groups, stimulation of the premotor and supplementary motor cortex to complete movements of limbs (Penfield 1958) . The patients reported they could not resist these movements, they perceived them as "forced upon them". Conversely, under stimulation of certain areas in these premotor areas they were not able to execute movements they wanted to execute, i.e. cortex stimulation lead to an inhibition. In a number of cases, however, stimulation of a cortex area near the foot of the central fissure at the border to the Sylvic fissure reliably lead to the will resp. desire to move the left resp. right hand or the left or right foot (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950 We see that Roth refers to three groups of findings (by Penfield & Rasmussen, Delgado, Brasil-Neto) , and as a bundle they apparently make a strong case for the possibility to stimulate full-blown actions. All of them sound like strict correlations between stimulation and action. But a closer look reveals that they are not all of that same kind: the last-mentioned experiment by Brasil-Neto, Pascual-Leone and others (Brasil-Neto et. al. 1992 ) only conveyed a weak probabilistic correlation. The experiment ran as follows: Test persons were instructed to arbitrarily move either the left or right finger. When their motor cortex was stimulated by magnetic pulses on the left or right hemisphere, they moved the opposite finger somewhat more frequently, although they subjectively believed in a free choice. This probabilistic dependence was only present when the movement took place within 200 milliseconds after the pulse, it disappeared at later movements. Hence Roth's description that "Brasil-Neto could cause finger movements which the test person described as 'willed'" is wrong: the general order to move came from the researchers, only the time of movement was at the test-person's choice, just some property of the movements was probabilistically influenced by the stimulation to a small extent. No actions were caused at all, and the feeling of control was only deceived in respect of the probability of left and right. A similar comment applies to the experiments of Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley (Wegner & Wheatley 1999) , two social psychologists whose results are also often used by Roth and others (although not here in this particular summary). The point here is again a purported illusion of control, but the test-persons' feeling of control was only deceived about the percentage of their share in the common action of two people. The design of the experiment is somewhat complicated: Two test-persons operating something like a two-handed computer mouse were instructed to draw approximate circles on a screen which was full with pictures of objects. Every half minute they had to bring the cursor to a stop without communicating about the place to stop. Afterwards, the persons had to judge on a percentage scale whether they had rather intended or just allowed the stop just here. As a modest distraction, the test persons heard unconnected words via headphones. In fact, one of the test persons was a confederate of the researchers. Between un-manipulated rounds, this person got the headphone command to move the cursor to a certain picture following a count-down. Hence, the stops in these rounds were primarily the effect of the confederate. Nevertheless, the real test person perceived these stops as effects of "his" action at an unduly high percentage. The percentage was especially high when the noun corresponding to the stopping-place object had recently been heard via headphone. Hence, the experiment shows that one can induce illusions about control and authorship which are-at least gradually-incorrect.
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No doubt, both results are interesting, but they are not groundbreaking news. That people can be manipulated in their freely chosen actions by chemical, linguistic and other means, that they can even be gradually deceived about their authorship, all that has been familiar since millennia, and whole industries live from that. (Wegner & Wheatley admit that lowbudget variants of such experiments can be carried out with a bowl of salted peanuts beside your TV chair). But the results discussed so far cannot be described as cases where test persons are determined to perform actions which they wrongly attribute to themselves. The experiments by 7 Wegner and Wheatley (loc. cit. 488f.) themselves admit some methodological problems concerning the experiment. The number of successful manipulated rounds is rather low (27-40 responses from 51 participants were valid at each of the four time-points checked, and only eight participants had valid responses across all four trials). The reason is that it was sometimes difficult or impossible to move the cursor to the desired stopping-place. One might also worry whether test persons after a number of manipulated rounds do not become suspicious about a possible bias. Another problem may lurk behind the fact that the manipulated rounds were inserted after a number of rounds where the stopping-decision was completely left to the real test persons. This might cause a general over-estimation of their personal share in the common action. Notice the constructions "she felt as though she wanted to move her left hand" and "she reports the desire to move her left hand"; we shall come back to them later on. It is more than clear that "reporting a desire" to move a limb is not the same as "having the intention or the wish" to move it. What Penfield and Rasmussen caused by stimulation is obviously not an action in the described, full-blown sense, but rather a strange feeling as if one's limb wanted to move. In contrast to these effects, electric stimulation of the brain may evoke more elaborate responses. For example, in one of our patients, electrical stimulation of the rostral part of the internal capsule produced head turning and slow displacement of the body to either side with a well-oriented and apparently normal sequence, as if the patient were looking for something. This stimulation was repeated six times on two different days with comparable results. The interesting fact was that the patient considered the evoked activity spontaneous and always offered a reasonable explanation for it. When asked "What are you doing?" the answers were, "I am looking for my slippers," "I heard a noise," "I am restless," and "I was looking under the bed." (Delgado, 115f.) Notice that Delgado himself gave a very cautious and unspectacular interpretation of these observations and their relevance. He comments on the scene as follows:
In this case it was difficult to ascertain whether the stimulation had evoked a movement which the patient tried to justify, or if a hallucination had been elicited which subsequently induced the patient to move and to explore the surroundings. (loc. cit. 116) In private correspondence (March and April 2007) Delgado told me that he still considered these attempts of an interpretation as correct, and showed a preference for the first one: the stimulation evoked a movement which the patient could not integrate, and the patient tried to give some ex-postexplanation for it. This phenomenon was repeatable, but (as the text in his book had already indicated) the content of these explanations differed between the rounds. 9 That means, Delgado's patient was apparently a case of the familiar phenomenon of rationalization and not a case of an external stimulation of an action.
As Delgado confirmed to me in private communication (10 th April, 2007) , the note in the 1969 book is the only appearance of this patient in his numerous publications.
10 This provides further evidence that the case of 9 "Repetition of ESB [=electrical stimulation of the brain, W. L.] showed that the evoked behavior was reliable but the patient gave different explanations for the movement which was not in his usual repertoire. He did not say that he had initiated the movement for a purpose: he tried to explain it 'after the fact.'" (J. M. R. Delgado, personal communication, 10 th April, 2007) . 10 The bibliography of the book lists 21 articles with Delgado as principal author, and 10 with him as a co-author. I retrieved and checked all these 21 articles (and some additional ones with potentially relevant titles), but none of them documents Delgado's patient or similar cases. All these articles just cover medical and technical aspects of electrode implantation and stimulation, or lengthy rows of experiments with monkeys and cats, or they provide data about the various sorts of stimulation effects we already know. As an illustration I summarize the content of the six articles with the most promising titles: Behavioral Changes During Intracerebral Electrical Stimulation (Higgins, Mahl, Delgado and Hamlin 1956) reports déjà vu phenomena and various changes in perception and verbal and bodily behavior which took place when the brain of an 11-year-old psychomotor epileptic with previous lobotomy was stimulated. These forms of behavior seem rather complex (yet highly irrational), but the boy provides no case similar to our patient. (Delgado 1960) (Delgado 1964 ) is a 100 pages summary about stimulation experiments with monkeys; the wording "free behavior" just refers to the fact that the stimulation could now be done via radio-control and not-as previously-with wires that restrained the free mobility of the animals;
Emotional Behavior in Animals and Humans

Intracerebral Radio Stimulation and Recording in Completely Free Patients
his patient had by far not the importance that was ascribed to him in the subsequent narrative chain. If there had really been something like a stimulation of a free action, such a sensational result would surely have deserved an appropriate publication. Let me summarize what we have found out as the empirical basis for the claims in question: There is (Delgado et al. 1968) reports the application of this new technology (i.e. radiocontrolled stimulation and EEG recording) for the clinical treatment of four psychomotor epileptics. Assaulting behavior reminiscent of earlier outbursts could be elicited by stimulation of the amygdala, but there is no evidence for the stimulation of "actions" either. 11 It is also illuminating to compare the later career of our passage from Physical Control of the Mind. Toward a Psychocivilized Society" with its original place and character. The full text of this book is available on the internet and can easily be retrieved via search-engines, but it is rewarding to hold a paper copy of it really in one's hand and to inspect it. It turns out as a paperback for a wider audience from the 1960s multi-disciplinary book series World Perspectives (other volumes in the series were, e.g., Jacques Maritain's Approaches to God, Werner Heisenberg's Across the Frontiers and Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society). The book contains a popular overview of contemporary brain research, especially under the respect of the possibilities of controlling and influencing socially problematic behaviour. In retrospect, we might perhaps not share Delgado's unbroken optimism in this point today, some commentators even ascribed a somewhat evangelical tone to the book (see Horgan 2005 and the critical literature mentioned there), but in any case it is an interesting document of its time, the history of neuroscience and its public perception. Although designed for a wider audience, the book also contains an extensive bibliography of approx. 240 research papers, some of them with titles which are prima facie promising for our issue (see my footnote 10). This appearance may perhaps have lead Wegner to overestimate the importance of the aforementioned case in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (see chapter 5.2 below). We may speculate that Wegner was confident that a proper documentation of the patient could easily be found in one of Delgado's 31 listed papers. In Gerhard Roth's text again, where Delgado is only indirectly cited via Wegner's book, all of this prehistory is completely concealed. From Roth's text alone, the reader gets the impression of a robust, well-documented state of research.
(1) fairly good evidence for some slight and gradual deceptions about control and authorship, which however cannot be described as external determinations to actions; moreover, we have (2) good evidence for replicable stimulations to movements and desires to move which, however, are perceived as "forced upon" by the patients. And we have (3) one single case of a seeming stimulation of an action which is not considered as very relevant by the researcher himself. The case is not documented in research papers but only mentioned in a book for a wider audience.
I know of no other evidence which could be interpreted as the external stimulation of an action. How can the way from this poor empirical basis to the bold claims cited at the beginning be reconstructed? How can one make a mountain from a mole-hill?
Wegner's creation of the "feeling of doing"
A hub of the recent debate is Daniel Wegner's 2002 book The illusion of conscious will. Wegner collects and evaluates a variety of arguments which seem to point against free will. As Roth himself admits, this book is also his source on Delgado and Brasil-Neto. Here is Wegner's report on Delgado's patient. Having summarized Penfield's research, Wegner comments and proceeds as follows:
[…] The movements Penfield stimulated in the brain were smooth movements involving coordinated sequences of the operation of multiple muscles, which looked to have the character of voluntary actions, at least from the outside (Penfield and Welch 1951; Porter and Lemon 1993) . They just didn't feel consciously willed to the patient who did them. In this case, then, the stimulation appears not to have yielded any experience of conscious will and instead merely prompted the occurrence of voluntary-appearing actions.
Penfield's remarkable set of observations are strikingly in counterpoint, though, with those of another brain stimulation researcher, José Delgado (1969). Delgado's techniques also stimulated the brain to produce movement, but in that case movement that was accompanied by a feeling of doing. Delgado (1969) reported, In one of our patients, electrical stimulation of the rostral part of the internal capsule produced head turning and slow displacement of the body to either side with a well-oriented and apparently normal sequence, as if the patient were looking for something. This stimulation was repeated six times on two different days with comparable results. The interesting fact was that the patient considered the evoked activity spontaneous and always offered a reasonable explanation for it. When asked "What are you doing?" the answers were, "I am looking for my slippers," "I heard a noise," "I am restless," and "I was looking under the bed." (Delgado, (115) (116) Wegner continues his comment as follows:
This observation suggests, at first glance, that there is indeed a part of the brain that yields consciously willed action when it is electrically stimulated. However, the patient's quick inventions of purposes sound suspiciously like confabulations, convenient stories made up to fit the moment. The development of an experience of will may even have arisen in this case from the stimulation of a whole actionproducing scenario in the person's experience. In Delgado's words, "In this case it was difficult to ascertain whether the stimulation had evoked a movement which the patient tried to justify, or if an hallucination had been elicited which subsequently induced the patient to move and to explore the surroundings (1969, 116) . (Wegner 2002, 45-47) Wegner's rendering of Penfield's and Delgado's findings is basically correct, and especially it reflects Delgado's cautious interpretation of the behavior of his patient. This interpretation is not only repeated in a literal quotation, it is even underlined by Wegner's subsequent commentary. (Wegner's summary of Brasil-Neto's magnetic stimulation experimentswhich I skip here for brevity-is also correct.) Problematic, however, is Wegner's introductory remark on Delgado which may direct the readers into a certain way of looking at things. Firstly, it is misleading to say that there is a "striking counterpoint" between Penfield and Delgado (this is not the case according to Wegner's own subsequent interpretation!), and secondly, the announcement that here we have a "movement that was accompanied by a feeling of doing" is a biased interpretation not warranted by Delgado's original text. At most one could perhaps say that the patient gave ex-post-rationalizations of his movements, or-to modify Wegner's words-he made "movements followed by a feeling of having done."
The most important thing that has changed by Wegner's compilation is the context: As its title suggests, Wegner's book is something like a list of pro-determinist arguments, and it connects arguments of very different kinds. For instance, it is Wegner who creates the bundle Penfield/Delgado/Brasil-Neto that will uncritically be taken on by Roth. The hasty reader of Wegner's text may overlook the difference, e.g., between probabilistic and strict dependencies, and in effect the empirical case for action-stimulation may look much stronger than it actually is. However, we should not blame Wegner for that. The critical reader can still keep things apart-if he wants.
A last problematic point, yet one of minor importance, is Wegner's lifting of Physical Control of the Mind into the rank of an empirical source-book. Reading Wegner, even the critical reader may now confidently believe that Delgado's patient-may he be important or notis at least a well-documented case. We shall see that all these problematic points will reappear in Roth's account of the issue. 5.3. Roth's creation of the "will to move"
The next and crucial step of obfuscation is done by Roth himself. Let us first compare Penfield & Rasmussen 1950 with Roth 2003 . Remember the constructions "she felt as though she wanted to move her left hand" and "she reports the desire to move her left hand" by Penfield and Rasmussen. In his own rendering of these results, Roth inserts two words which completely change the meaning (italics W. L.):
In a number of cases, however, stimulation of a cortex area near the foot of the central fissure at the border to the Sylvic fissure reliably lead to the will resp. desire [zum Willen bzw. Bedürfnis] to move the left resp. right hand or the left or right foot (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950) . (Roth 2003 , for the German original see footnote 6) As we said before, "reporting a desire to move" is clearly not the same as "having the will to move", but Roth's mistranslation turns the meaning of the text in that direction. A similar observation can be made concerning Roth's use of Delgado's patient. Changing the overall message of the text into its opposite is especially easy here, namely by simply cutting away Delgado's and Wegner's skeptical postscripts. Roth also changes the construction so that the fact that it is only one patient is concealed: "the patient" now appears as an abstraction (the patient in general!), and not as a reference to one particular person as in Delgado's text above. (Roth's construction "in a number of cases …" shortly before may further foster this wrong impression). And finally, if the description of Brasil-Neto's probabilistic results (false as it is anyway!) is placed immediately after the incomplete description of Delgado's patient, the reader gets the completely false impression that magnetic transcranial stimulation works as reliably as electric stimulation of the brain.
A synopsis of the textual changes
To get a synopsis of the textual changes, let us finally have a second look at Roth's core text about the empirical findings backing his claim, this time equipped with more background knowledge. The reader is invited to read the text twice, once as it stands for itself, and once including my comments (in <italics> and reduced type size) which mark the places where the earlier textual tradition underwent important changes.
"In a number of cases, however, stimulation of a cortex area near the foot of the central fissure at the border to the Sylvic fissure reliably lead to the will resp. desire <mistranslation, unwarranted insertion of "will resp."!> to move the left resp. right hand or the left or right foot (Penfield and Rasmussen 1950) .
The Spanish neurologist José Delgado reported that under similar conditions as in Penfield stimulation of the rostral part of the so-called internal capsule [i.e., …] lead to movements of the <"the" suggests generality!> patient which he ascribed to himself. <Delgado's & Wegner's skeptical postscripts on the patient are omitted!> Similarly <conceals the difference between strict and probabilistic correlations!>, by transcranial magnetic stimulation the neurologist Brasil-Neto could cause finger movements which the test person described as "willed" (both results cited after Wegner 2002) ." (Roth 2003, 516 ; for the German original see footnote 6.) This strikingly inadequate use of the actual evidence might perhaps raise the suspicion of deliberate manipulation. But we should be hesitant with such a verdict; a massively biased look at evidence known from second hand, based on a firm conviction what data could only be expected, is probably the better explanation.
